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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
 
 
 
DIANA RAMONA GAVRA et al., 
   
   Plaintiffs, 
 v. 
 
GOOGLE INC., 
 
   Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case No.: 5:12-CV-06547-PSG 
 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
 
(Re: Docket No. 10) 
 
 
  
 In this action for defamation, extortion, and breach of privacy filed by Diana Ramona 
Gavra (“Gavra”), Lawyers Office “Gavra Diana” (“Lawyers Office”), and the Iuris Civilis 
Association (“ICA”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), Defendant Google Inc. (“Google”) moves to 
dismiss the first amended complaint (“FAC”).  Although presented with far more polish and detail, 
Google’s argument is familiar and straightforward:   Congress gave us a pass when it enacted 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”).  As the court explains below 
with a bit more polish and detail of its own, Google is right.1  The motion is GRANTED.   
  
                                                          
1 Pursuant to Civil L.R. 7-1(b), the court determined oral argument was unnecessary. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs’ claims against Google stem from the posting of unflattering videos by a former 
client of Gavra's, Tom Baran (“Baran”).  Gavra, an attorney in Romania, represented Baran and his 
family, until the relationship soured after a dispute arose between client and counsel.2  Baran then 
posted thirteen video clips on YouTube of “alleged injustices suffered by this family.”3  These 
videos accuse Gavra of adultery, fraud, and drug abuse, among other criminal and morally 
questionable activities.  Plaintiffs allege that these videos are defamatory, that they contain private 
information, and that they have been used to blackmail and extort Plaintiffs. 
Gavra emailed YouTube and Google to request removal of the videos.4  Although it 
notified Baran of the complaint against him, YouTube declined to remove the videos itself because 
it was “unable to adjudicate the veracity of postings” and could not “identify a violation of [its] 
Privacy Guidelines.”5 
On February 24, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a “criminal offense complaint” in Romania against 
Baran and his new lawyer for attempted extortion.6  In December, the Romanian Public Ministry 
indicted against them, but the matter has yet to be adjudicated.7  On December 27, 2012, Plaintiffs 
filed this parallel suit against Google for invasion of privacy, defamation, and 
                                                          
2 See Docket No. 9 at 8.  As one astute commentator has observed, a surprising number of Section 
230 cases involving lawyers proceeding pro se.  See 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/01/section_230_sti.htm (last visited July 17, 2013) 
(citing Klayman v. Zuckerberg, Case No. 11-874 RBW, 2012 WL 6725588 (D.D.C. Dec. 28, 
2012)). 
 
3 Id. at 9. 
 
4 See id. at 17. 
 
5 See Id., Ex. A. at 2-3, 5. 
 
6 See Id. at 12, Ex. B at 1. 
 
7 See Docket No. 22-1. 
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“blackmail/extortion,” arising from Google’s continuing distribution of the videos even after Gavra 
provided notice.8  Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 19, 2013.9 
II. LEGAL STANDARDS 
A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) “where the complaint lacks a 
cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”10  The court must 
generally accept as true all “well-pleaded factual allegations,”11 and must construe the alleged facts 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.12  But any factual allegations “must be enough to raise a 
right to relief above the speculative level” such that the claim “is plausible on its face.”13  Thus, a 
complaint should only be dismissed where it “appears beyond doubt the plaintiff can prove no set 
of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.”14  
Leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires.15  But a motion for leave to 
amend may be denied if it would be futile or legally insufficient.16  A proposed amendment is futile 
if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid 
and sufficient claim or defense.17 
 
                                                          
 
8 See Docket No. 1. 
 
9 See Docket No. 9. 
 
10 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 
11 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). 
 
12 See Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 
13 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007). 
 
14 Clegg v. Cult of Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 
15 Fed R. Civ. P. 15(a). 
 
16 See Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 
17 See id. 
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III. DISCUSSION 
 Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as a publisher or speaker of any information provided by another content 
provider.”18  The CDA “provide[s] a robust immunity for internet service providers and websites, 
with courts adopting a relatively expansive definition of ‘interactive computer service’ and a 
relatively restrictive definition of ‘information content provider.’”19  A website is liable for the 
unlawful content of online material only if the website contributes “materially . . . to its alleged 
unlawfulness.”20  Merely providing third parties with neutral tools to create web content, even if 
the website knows those parties are using the tools to create illegal content, does not create 
liability, nor does refraining from removing objectionable content, despite receiving notice. 21   
 Recognizing that their claims stand or fall on Google’s status as a publisher,22 Plaintiffs 
first argue that publication does not encompass the action challenged here:  Google’s failure to 
remove the video even after notice.23  Because the factual basis of their cause of action is failure to 
remove and not publication, Plaintiffs argue, the CDA does not apply and Google nevertheless may 
be held liable.24  But in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., the Ninth Circuit disposed of this very argument.  
There, the plaintiff sued Yahoo! for failing to remove salacious pictures of her posted, without her 
                                                          
18 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
 
19 Goddard v. Google Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (internal quotations 
omitted) (quoting Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003)).  
 
20 Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167 
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 
21 See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009); Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1169 
n.4; Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 
22 Because it is undisputed that Baran created the videos in question without any material help from 
Google, Google is not an “information content provider” and so may not be excluded from the 
CDA’s protection on these grounds. 
 
23 See Docket No. 14 at 4-5. 
 
24 Plaintiffs' claims are "alleged" because, even if they could establish a legal basis for liability, 
Plaintiffs have yet to prove actual defamation or extortion; all they have is an indictment. 
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consent, by an ex-boyfriend on a Yahoo! website.25  In considering the plaintiff’s negligence claim, 
the court found that the duty Yahoo! was alleged to have breached plainly derived from its activity 
as a publisher—Yahoo! had allegedly taken steps and then “negligently” failed to de-publish the 
offending content—and that the CDA provided blanket immunity.26  The court held that deciding 
“whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content” is exactly the type of conduct that 
publishers engage in,27  and the plaintiff could not circumvent Section 230(c) protections by simply 
renaming her theory of liability “negligence” instead of “publication.”28  Plaintiffs here similarly 
claim that Google owes a duty of care requiring it to remove videos from its website that, by their 
content, cause foreseeable harm.  But this duty exists only if the court treats Google as a publisher 
of the content on its websites.  Barnes and the CDA explicitly prohibit imposing liability for such 
actions.29 
 Undaunted, Plaintiffs next argue that they are suing Google as a distributor, not as a 
publisher, and that the CDA protects only the latter.  The distinction between a distributor and a 
publisher arises from common law defamation and was addressed within the context of the CDA 
by the Fourth Circuit in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.30  The court in Zeran concluded that the 
terms “distributor” and “publisher” imply only “that different standards of liability may be applied 
                                                          
 
25 570 F.3d at 1098-99. 
 
26 See id. at 1102-03. 
 
27 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 n.18 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332); see 
also Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (refusing to find liability for failing to remove 
objectionable content). 
 
28 See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102-03. 
 
29 In Barnes, Yahoo! may have at least assumed the duties of a publisher by promising the plaintiff 
that it would remove the videos.  Google has taken no such affirmative steps here. 
30 129 F.3d 327. 
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within the larger publisher category” and so distributors are still publishers for the purposes of 
Section 230.31  It then affirmed the motion to dismiss. 
 Plaintiffs implore the court to ignore the Zeran precedent, to distinguish between publishers 
and distributors, and to thus deprive Google of Section 230 coverage.  Even if the court were so 
inclined, this argument is unavailing, however, because the Ninth Circuit has already provided a 
different formula for addressing the scope of Section 230 immunity that still precludes Plaintiffs’ 
claims.32  Unlike the Fourth Circuit, which implicitly relied on defamation common law to 
interpret Section 230, the Ninth Circuit instead directs courts to look to “whether the cause of 
action inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content 
provided by another.”33  Publication includes “reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to publish 
or withdraw from publication third-party content.”34  In so doing, the Ninth Circuit has observed 
that, although the CDA was influenced by defamation common law, “a law's scope often differs 
from its genesis”35 and the common law distinction between a publisher and a distributor “has little 
to do with the meaning of the statutory language.”36  The Ninth Circuit opined that Section 230 
does not mention and is not limited by defamation common law, and has even applied Section 230 
to cases in which no defamation claim was stated.37  What matters is not the name of the cause of 
                                                          
 
31 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332 (emphasis original).  
 
32 The Ninth Circuit has noted, however, that "every court to reach the issue has decided Congress 
intended to immunize both distributors and publishers."  Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 n.10 
(9th Cir. 2003). 
 
33 Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102. 
 
34 Id.  
 
35 Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101 (quoting Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. 
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
 
36 Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1104.   
 
37 See Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
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action but the rather the underlying conduct that liability is predicated on.  Because Google's 
conduct here falls well within the bounds of publication activity, it is protected by the CDA 
whether or not it is “distributor.” 
 Section 230 of the CDA was intended “to protect websites against the evil of liability for 
failure to remove offensive content.”38  Such conduct is exactly the type of activity underlying 
Plaintiffs' negligence and defamation claims.  Likewise, Plaintiffs’ extortion claim is simply a 
relabeled negligence claim, which is in turn another attempt to hold Google liable for publication 
activity.  Google has assumed no affirmative duty to protect Plaintiffs from extortion and to 
remove the videos, and, even if it had, any such duty would have arisen from its role as a publisher.  
The CDA protects Google in all these instances.  Because Plaintiffs cannot overcome the statutory 
bar to liability by alleging new facts, their claims are dismissed without leave to amend. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Google's motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
Dated:  July 17, 2013  
       _________________________________ 
 PAUL S. GREWAL 
 United States Magistrate Judge 
 
                                                          
 
38 Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1174. 
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